Because of their pervasiveness, and the recurrent observation of misuse, identifying the determinants of appropriation of common pool resources (CPR) has generated considerable interest in many fields of the social sciences. These resources are characterized by joint access by a finite set of users (outsiders can be excluded, but not individual community members) and by rivalry in appropriation (appropriation by one user reduces the supply available to others). When community members decide individually on the appropriation of a common pool resource, they create negative externalities on each others which they do not take into account in their private profit maximization calculus, leading to overuse of the resource. 
In what follows, we refer to costly cooperation as a situation where cooperation entails variable costs in addition to the traditional fixed costs. incentives, weighted by the unit costs of counteracting each type of incentive to default. Enforcement costs \ can be expected to increase with these incentives to default: The larger the incentives, the more creative will a community member be in trying to cheat and conceal its acts, and hence the more difficult it may be to detect cheating and enforce rules.
The role of heterogeneity on cooperation has been extensively debated in the literature.
Heterogeneity has been associated both with poor cooperative performance (Ostrom, 1992; Kanbur, 1992) and with successful performance (Olson, 1965; Baland and Platteau, 1997). As noted by Baland and Plateau, there are many types of heterogeneity and they bear differentially on cooperation. We explore here two types of heterogeneity: differentials in production costs and differential constraints on capacity to appropriate. We show that, under costly cooperation, heterogeneity restricts the ability to find an acceptable cooperative solution, and that inequality in capacity reduces the optimal over appropriation in the cooperative solution.
In the analysis that follows, we consider the CPR to be community pasture land where community members choose the optimal number of animals to stock. This allows us to use a linear-quadratic specification of the production function that has been widely used in studies of livestock weight gain (Hart et al., 1989).
In section 2, we develop the model of costly cooperation when community members are identical.
We then consider in section 3 the case where heterogeneity comes from differential production costs across members. In section 4 heterogeneity results from differential constraints on capacity to stock animals.
Section concludes with a discussion of some policy implications of the model.
Basic symmetric model of costly cooperation
Consider a two-person game over the number of animals (n 1 n 2 ) to graze on a common property pasture of given size H. We assume that the herders are homogenous, risk-neutral profit-maximizers, and that each herder has a constant marginal cost of stocking animals, c. Productivity of forage for each individual is a decreasing function of the total number of animals stocked; thus, a crowding out externality captures the negative effect of adding an additional head of cattle on total weight gain for all animals 
